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Abstract
Dematerialization through services is a popular proposal for reducing envi-
ronmental impact. The idea is that by shifting from the production of goods
to the provision of services, a society can reduce its material demands. But do
societies with a larger service sector actually dematerialize? I test the ‘demate-
rialization through services’ hypothesis with a focus on fossil fuel consumption
and carbon emissions — the primary drivers of climate change. I find no ev-
idence that a service transition leads to carbon dematerialization. Instead, a
larger service sector is associated with greater use of fossil fuels and greater car-
bon emissions per person. This suggests that ‘dematerialization through services’
is not a valid sustainability policy.
∗Author contact: blairfix@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
‘Dematerialization through services’ (Heiskanen and Jalas, 2000) is a popular
proposal for reducing environmental impact. The idea is that by shifting from
producing goods to providing services, a society can reduce its use of materials.
But do societies with a larger service sector actually dematerialize? I test the
‘dematerialization through services’ hypothesis with a focus on fossil fuel use
and carbon emissions — the primary drivers of climate change. I ask: does a
service transition lead to fossil fuel and/or carbon emissions dematerialization?
Using international data from the World Bank, I test for both relative and
absolute carbon dematerialization through services. Over the long term, I find
that a service transition leads to an increase in the carbon intensity of GDP. Sim-
ilarly, I find that a service transition leads to increasing carbon emissions per
capita. This finding echos Jevons’ paradox. Jevons (1906) found that the adop-
tion of more energy efficient technology led to greater (not lesser) energy use
(Alcott, 2005; Polimeni et al, 2012). Like more efficient technology, the service
sector can supposedly do more with less. It generates more value added per
unit of direct energy input. Yet a service transition produces the opposite of
its intended effect. The relative growth of the service sector is associated with
greater energy use (and hence greater emissions). The reasons why this occurs
are likely complex, but the implications are simple. The evidence indicates that
‘dematerialization through services’ is not a valid sustainability policy.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the rationale behind the
‘dematerialization through services’ proposal. Section 3 outlines methods and
Section 4 discusses results. Section 5 discusses reasons why the ‘dematerializa-
tion through services’ proposal fails. Section 6 concludes with thoughts on the
significance of this evidence, and what it means for sustainability policy.
2 Dematerialization Through Services: The Rationale
The ‘dematerialization through services’ proposal begins with an uncontentious
observation. In terms of direct energy use, the service sector is less energy inten-
sive than industrial sectors like mining, manufacturing, and construction. For
instance, the US service sector is about 3 to 4 times less energy intensive than
US industry (Fig. 1).
Proponents of the ‘dematerialization through services’ hypothesis take this
uncontentious observation, and go one step further. Because of the lower direct
resource intensity of the service sector, they propose that a “transition from an
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Figure 1: Comparing the Direct Energy Intensity of US Sectors
This figure compares the direct energy intensity of US industry and US services. ‘Indus-
try’ consists of mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities. ‘Services’ consist of
all other non-industrial sectors (except agriculture). Panel A shows the energy intensity
of value added for US industry and US services over the years 1997 to 2017. Panel B
shows energy use per worker for US industry and US services over the years 1998 to
2016. For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
industrial to a service society might bring about a decline in the use of materials”
(Herman et al, 1990). A non-exhaustive list of authors who have echoed this
proposal would include Cooper (1999), Hawken (2000), Herman et al (1990),
Hinterberger and Schmidt-Bleek (1999), Jackson (1996), Kahn (1979), Lovins
et al (1999), OECD (2000), Panayotou et al (2000) , Romm et al (1999), Romm
(2002), Stahel (1997), Victor (2010), and White et al (1999). For a good review
of the literature on this topic, see Heiskanen and Jalas (2000) and Heiskanen
et al (2001).
While based on plausible reasoning, the ‘dematerialization through services’
proposal has many critics. Djellal and Gallouj (2016), Jespersen (1999), and
Lawn (2001) have all argued that it is wrong to treat the service sector as a
separate entity from industry. Instead, they argue that services are intrinsically
connected to the production of goods (and vice versa). For instance, a car deal-
ership (a service) depends on the production of cars for its existence. Likewise,
the car manufacturer depends on the dealership to sell its product. The service
sector cannot and does not operate in isolation (Giampietro et al, 2012; Hall
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and Klitgaard, 2012). One way to capture this interdependence is to measure
both direct and indirect energy use. Jesperson (1999) finds that when indirect
energy use is included, the Danish private service sector has an energy intensity
similar to the manufacturing sector.
Kander (2005) identifies a more subtle problem. The growth of the service
sector’s share of value added is affected by price change. The problem is that
service sector prices tend to rise faster than the price of goods. This means that
using ‘nominal’ prices can inflate the growth of the service sector. When ‘real’
prices are used, there is less evidence for dematerialization through services
(Henriques and Kander, 2010).
Another problem, is that the transition to services could increase transport
volumes (Ellger and Scheiner, 1997). Amazon.com’s business model is a good
example. Greater transportation volume could nullify any dematerialization that
might otherwise occur.
There is also the problem of open borders. Western countries that are dein-
dustrializing are not doing so in isolation. Instead, they are off-shoring many
of their industrial processes to developing countries. Davis and Caldeira (2010)
find that the US and Western Europe have significant net CO2 emissions embod-
ied in trade. Similarly, Knight and Schor (2014) find that evidence for emissions-
GDP decoupling disappears when they account for the emissions embodied in
trade. This means we should be skeptical of dematerialization claims that do
not account for trade effects (Stern et al, 1996; Day et al, 2014).
But perhaps the most damning critique of ‘dematerialization through ser-
vices’ is that its proponents focus on relative rather than absolute dematerializa-
tion. Proponents tout the decreasing energy intensity of GDP. But this is a relative
(i.e. intensive) metric that does not indicate the scale of energy use (Giampietro
et al, 2012). Our impact on the biosphere depends on the scale of consumption,
not the efficiency of this consumption (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971).
Giampietro et al. (2012) use the analogy of a mouse and an elephant to
illustrate this point. A mouse has a metabolic rate of about 3W/kg, while an
elephant has a metabolic rate of about 0.5W/kg. Clearly the elephant is more
efficient at using energy. However, the elephant’s total energy demand is about
50,000 times that of the mouse. Despite its greater efficiency, the elephant has a
far greater impact on its environment. Likewise a wealthy nation may generate
more value added per unit of energy than a developing nation. But if the wealthy
nation uses more non-renewable energy than the developing nation, its greater
‘efficiency’ is a moot point for sustainability purposes. Giampietro et al. do not
mince words:
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That modern neoclassical economists (and quite a few ecological economists)
see elephants as dematerialized versions of mice would be a mere amusing
finding, if it were not for the fact that this silly narrative is being taught to
students in almost every academic programme dealing with the sustainability
of human progress ... (Giampietro et al, 2012)
Similar critiques have been raised by Daly (2013), Hall and Klitgaard (2012),
and Jackson (2009), among others. I take this critique seriously. Thus, I test for
both relative and absolute dematerialization.
3 Methods
To test for dematerialization through services, I focus on fossil fuel use and CO2
emissions. This gives a direct indicator of climate-change sustainability. I use
four different metrics of dematerialization (Tbl. 1). I define relative demateri-
alization as a decline in the fossil fuel and/or carbon intensity of GDP. I define
absolute carbon dematerialization as a reduction in per capita carbon emissions
and fossil fuel use (not total emissions and/or fossil fuel use). I use per capita
data because I compare countries that have different populations. This removes
the effects of population growth, which I regard as a separate sustainability is-
sue from the growth of per capita consumption. Service sector size is measured
using both employment share and value-added share (using current prices).1
I test for a scaling relation between each dematerialization metric (D) and
the service fraction (Sfrac) of employment or value added:
D∝ Sαfrac (1)
Equation 1 can be rewritten in terms of a log-log regression:
log(D)∝ α · log(Sfrac) (2)
The scaling-exponent α quantifies how the dematerialization metric D behaves
1 Why not measure service sector value added using ‘real’ prices? First, this data is not
available from the World Bank database used here. Second, there are numerous problems with
price deflation. The main problem is that relative prices change over time, meaning the choice
of base year will affect the resulting deflation (Fix, 2015; Nitzan, 1992; Nitzan and Bichler,
2009). Kander (2005) highlights how this affects the calculation of the service sector’s share
of value added. This same problem also leads to systematic uncertainty in the calculation of
real GDP. However, out of convention, I use standard measures of real GDP to test for relative
dematerialization. But it is important to recognize that real GDP is not necessarily an objective
measure of economic output (Fix, 2019).
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Table 1: Metrics of Dematerialization and Service Sector Size
Absolute Dematerialization Relative Dematerialization
Fossil fuel use per capita Fossil fuel intensity of GDP
CO2 emissions per capita CO2 intensity of GDP
Service Sector Size
Service sector share of employment
Service sector share of value added
Table 2: World Bank Data Series
Series Code Description
EG.EGY.PRIM.PP.KD Energy intensity level of primary energy (MJ/$2011 PPP GDP)
EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total)
EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)
EN.ATM.CO2E.PC CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
EN.ATM.CO2E.PP.GD.KD CO2 emissions (kg per 2011 PPP $ of GDP)
NV.SRV.TETC.ZS Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)
SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)
SL.IND.EMPL.ZS Employment in industry (% of total employment)
SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS Employment in services (% of total employment)
SL.TLF.TOTL.IN Labor force, total
SP.POP.TOTL Population, total
as the service sector grows. A negative exponent indicates that the dematerial-
ization metric declines as the service sector increases in size. This is evidence
for dematerialization through services. A positive exponent indicates that the
dematerialization metric increases as the service sector increases in size. This is
evidence against dematerialization through services.
All data for this test comes from the World Bank and covers 217 countries
over the years 1991 to 2017 (Tbl. 2). This data is sufficient to conduct a robust
test of dematerialization trends between countries. It also allows a more limited
test for trends within countries. The short (30 year) time frame limits the ability
to establish statistically significant trends within countries.
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Figure 2: Testing for Absolute Carbon Dematerialization Through Services
This figure tests for absolute dematerialization through services using between-country
evidence. Lines represent the path through time of countries over the years 1991 to
2017. All plots use log-log scales. R2 values are for log-log regressions on mean values
for each country. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction interval of each regression.
Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011
purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the rela-
tion between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C
and D keep the same y-axis as Panels A and B (respectively), but measure service sector
size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl.
2).
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Figure 3: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services — Within-
Country Evidence
This figure tests for absolute dematerialization through services using within-country
evidence. Histograms show the distribution of within-country scaling exponents α (see
Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) over the years 1991 to 2017. Vertical lines indicate the mean within-
country exponent. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP
(measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share.
Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector em-
ployment share. Panels C and D are similar to panels A and B, but measure service
sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank
(Tbl. 2).
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Figure 4: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services — Between-
Country Evidence
This figure tests for relative dematerialization through services using between-country
evidence. Lines represent the path through time of countries over the years 1991 to
2017. All plots use log-log scales. R2 values are for log-log regressions on mean values
for each country. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction interval of each regression.
Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011
purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the rela-
tion between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C
and D keep the same y-axis as Panels A and B (respectively), but measure service sector
size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl.
2).
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Figure 5: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services — Within-
Country Evidence
This figure tests for relative dematerialization through services using within-country ev-
idence. Histograms show the distribution of within-country scaling exponents α (see
Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) over the years 1991 to 2017. Vertical lines indicate the mean within-
country exponent. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP
(measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share.
Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector em-
ployment share. Panels C and D are similar to panels A and D, but measure service
sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank
(Tbl. 2).
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Table 3: Absolute Carbon Dematerialization — Between-Country Evidence
Regression α R2 p
Fossil Fuel Use per Capita vs. Service Employment Share 2.55 0.62 ***
C02 Emissions per Capita vs. Service Employment Share 2.21 0.64 ***
Fossil Fuel Use per Capita vs. Service Value-Added Share 1.98 0.13 ***
C02 Emissions per Capita vs. Service Value-Added Share 2.18 0.16 ***
Table 4: Absolute Carbon Dematerialization — Within-Country Evidence
Regression α¯ R¯2 p¯
Fossil Fuel Use per Capita vs. Service Employment Share 0.81 0.41 0.12
C02 Emissions per Capita vs. Service Employment Share 0.90 0.41 0.13
Fossil Fuel Use per Capita vs. Service Value-Added Share 0.50 0.36 0.11
C02 Emissions per Capita vs. Service Value-Added Share 0.56 0.31 0.17
Table 5: Relative Carbon Dematerialization — Between-Country Evidence
Regression α R2 p
Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP vs. Service Employment Share 0.59 0.17 ***
C02 Intensity of GDP vs. Service Employment Share 0.64 0.29 ***
Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP vs. Service Value-Added Share 0.11 0.00 0.62
C02 Intensity of GDP vs. Service Value-Added Share 0.40 0.03 0.02
Table 6: Relative Carbon Dematerialization — Within-Country Evidence
Regression α¯ R¯2 p¯
Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP vs. Service Employment Share -1.00 0.48 0.12
C02 Intensity of GDP vs. Service Employment Share -0.87 0.42 0.13
Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP vs. Service Value-Added Share -1.37 0.41 0.10
C02 Intensity of GDP vs. Service Value-Added Share -1.03 0.35 0.17
R2 and p-values are for log-log regressions. α is the slope of the regression (see Eq. 1 and 2 ).
*** p < 10−4
α¯, R¯2 and p¯ indicate the average within-country regression values.
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4 Results
Figures 2–5 show the results of my test for carbon dematerialization through
services. Figures 2 tests for absolute dematerialization using trends between
countries. Figure 3 tests for absolute dematerialization using trends within coun-
tries. Figure 4 tests for relative dematerialization using trends between countries.
Lastly, Figure 5 tests for relative dematerialization using trends within countries.
Results are summarized in Tables 3–6.
I find no evidence that a service transition leads to absolute carbon demate-
rialization. The between-country trends are clear (Fig. 2 and Tbl. 3). A service
transition is systematically associated with the growth of per capita fossil fuel
use and carbon emissions. Within-country trends (Fig. 3 and Tbl. 4) are also
positive on average, but with a smaller scaling exponent and weaker statistical
significance. This weaker evidence is likely due to the short period covered by
the within-country data. This allows statistical ‘noise’ to dominate the ‘signal’.
Still, the data is sufficient to draw conclusions. There is no evidence for a neg-
ative scaling exponent (on average) either between or within countries. Thus,
this test does not support absolute dematerialization through services.
The evidence for relative dematerialization through services is less clear.
Between-country evidence (Fig. 4 and Tbl. 5) indicates that a service tran-
sition is associated with greater fossil fuel intensity and CO2 intensity of GDP.
This relation is statistically significant when service sector size is measured us-
ing employment. It is not significant (at the 1% level) when service sector size
is measured using value added. Since there is no evidence for a negative scaling
exponent, the between-country data does not support relative dematerialization
through services. However, the within-country evidence seems to contradict this
finding (Fig. 5 and Tbl. 6). Here, the average scaling relation is negative, but
with weak statistical significance. The within-country data supports relative de-
materialization through services, but contradicts the between-country evidence.
I discuss the reason for this apparent contradiction in Section 5.
To summarize, the evidence indicates that a service transition does not lead
to absolute carbon dematerialization. Thus, we must conclude that a service
transition does not lead to greater sustainability. The evidence for relative car-
bon dematerialization is less clear. While unimportant for sustainability, relative
dematerialization is a popular concept among environmental economists. Thus,
it is important to understand the cause of the contradictory evidence.
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5 Discussion
Our test of dematerialization through services yielded two notable findings.
First, the evidence for relative dematerialization was conflicting. Second, there
was no evidence for absolute dematerialization through services. I discuss pos-
sible explanations for these findings below.
5.1 The Contradictory Evidence for Relative Carbon Dematerializa-
tion
Why does between-country evidence suggest that relative carbon dematerializa-
tion through services is a failure? Yet within-country evidence suggests that it is
a success? The answer is that relative carbon dematerialization trends are likely
non-linear. They have an inverted-U shape over the long term.
To understand this behavior, we begin with the following relation:
EF F
GDP
=
ET
GDP
· EF F
ET
(3)
This equation states that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (EF F/GDP) is driven by
the energy intensity of GDP (ET/GDP) and the fossil fuel fraction of total energy
use (EF F/ET). We want to know the trends in the right-hand terms in Eq. 3.
Figure 6A shows between-country trends in the energy intensity of GDP vs.
service employment share. Figure 6B shows within-country trends for the same
relation. A service transition is associated with a decrease in the energy intensity
of GDP. This is often touted as evidence for relative dematerialization through
services. However, we must account for the type of energy used. Figures 6C and
6D show that the fossil fuel energy fraction tends to increase with a service tran-
sition. This is evident both between countries (Fig. 6C) and within countries
(Fig. 6D). Why does this positive relation exist? Likely because a service transi-
tion is a basic part of industrialization. And the latter involves transitioning to
fossil fuels (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012; Smil, 2008).
To summarize, the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease with a service
transition. In contrast, the fossil fuel energy fraction tends to increase. These
opposing trends explain the between-country relative dematerialization evidence
(Fig. 4). Over the long term, the increasing fossil fuel fraction drowns out the
decreasing energy intensity of GDP. Since between-country analysis is sensitive
to long-term trends, we find that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP increases with
a service transition.
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Figure 6: Decomposing Relative Carbon Dematerialization
This figure dissects the relative carbon dematerialization results in Figures 4 and 5.
Panel A shows between-country trends in the energy intensity of GDP vs. service sector
employment share. Lines indicate the path through time of individual countries. Panel
B shows the distribution of within-country trends. Results are for log-log regressions on
the energy intensity of GDP vs. service sector employment share (see Eqs. 1 and 2).
Panel C shows between-country trends for the percentage of energy derived from fossil
fuels vs. service sector employment share. Panel D shows the distribution of within-
country trends. Results are for log-log regressions on the fossil fuel energy fraction
vs. service sector employment share. Panels A and C use log-log scales. R2 values are
for log-log regressions on national averages. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction
interval of each regression. All data for comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2).
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Figure 7: The Plateau of the Fossil Fuel Energy Fraction and the U-Shaped
Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP
This figure shows how the evolution of the fossil fuel energy fraction leads to an inverted
U-shaped relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service sector employ-
ment share. Panel A shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel energy fraction
and service employment share. Boxplots show the distribution of scaling exponents (α)
for log-log regressions (see Eqs. 1 and 2). The distribution of α is disaggregated by
country’s service sector size. Panel B shows US fossil fuel energy fraction vs. service
sector employment share. Panel C shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel
intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Boxplots show the distribution
of scaling exponents (α) for log-log regressions. The distribution of α is disaggregated
by country’s service sector size. Panel D shows the fossil fuel intensity of US GDP rela-
tive to service sector employment share. Data for Panels A and C comes from the World
Bank (Tbl. 2). For US data sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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When we use within-country data (Fig. 5), we measure short-term trends.
This is because the World Bank data covers less than 30 years. Over this period,
within-country data indicates that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP decreases with
a service transition. This contradictory trend is caused by non-linear behavior
in the fossil fuel energy fraction. When countries industrialize, they undergo an
energy transition to fossil fuels. But this energy transition eventually reaches
fixation — usually when 80% to 90% of energy comes from fossil fuels. As a
result, the fossil fuel fraction has a non-linear relation with service sector size.
Figures 7A and 7B illustrate this behavior. Figure 7A shows within-country
trends between the fossil fuel energy fraction and service employment share.
Each boxplot represents the distribution of the scaling exponent (α) for a log-log
regression (see Eq. 1 and 2). Results are disaggregated by service sector size. We
see a clear downward trend as the service sector grows. In countries with a small
service sector (less than 50% of employment), the fossil fuel fraction increases
with a service transition. But in countries with a large service sector (greater
than 50% of employment), the fossil fuel fraction remains roughly constant.
This behavior is also evident in the US (Fig. 7B). From 1800 to 1920, the fossil
fuel fraction increased as the service sector grew. But after 1920, the fossil fuel
fraction plateaued — corresponding to a service sector employment share of
roughly 40%.
This non-linearity causes an inverted U-shaped relation between the fossil
fuel intensity of GDP and service sector size. When the service sector is small,
the fossil fuel fraction grows rapidly. This trumps the secular decline in the
energy intensity of GDP. The result is an increase in the fossil fuel intensity of
GDP with a service transition. But when the fossil fuel transition is complete,
the declining energy intensity of GDP dominates the trend. This causes the fossil
fuel intensity of GDP to decrease with further service growth.
Figure 7C and 7D illustrate this inverted U-shaped behavior. Figure 7C shows
within-country trends between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service em-
ployment share. Each boxplot represents the distribution of the scaling expo-
nent (α) for a log-log regression (see Eq. 1 and 2). Results are disaggregated
by service sector size. The relation is positive when the service sector is small.
This means a service transition leads to greater fossil fuel intensity of GDP. But
the relation becomes negative when the service sector is large. This means a
continued service transition leads to lesser fossil fuel intensity of GDP
If we had access to long-term trends for each individual country, they would
likely look like those of the United States (Fig. 7B). From 1800 to 1920, the
fossil fuel intensity of US GDP increased as the service sector grew. But after
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1920, the fossil fuel intensity of US GDP decreased as the service sector grew.
The change in behavior corresponds to the plateau of fossil fuel use (Fig. 7B).
Importantly, the downward part of the U does not fully reverse the upward
part. This means that the long-term US trend is positive, even though the recent
trend is negative. This explains our conflicting results in Figures 4 and 5. The
between-country analysis captures snapshots of countries along the long-term
upward trend. The within-country analysis captures recent trends. Evidently
most countries are now in the downward part of the U. However, this decrease
in the fossil fuel intensity of GDP has not undone the large increases of the past.
5.2 Judging the Success of Relative Carbon Dematerialization
The U shape in the fossil fuel intensity of GDP complicates the judgment of
relative dematerialization through services. Our verdict depends on our choice
of time scale. Is a services transition a long-term phenomena? If so, then relative
carbon dematerialization through services is a failure. Or is a service transition
a recent phenomena? If so, relative carbon dematerialization has some success.
Trends in the United States suggest that a service transition is a long-term
process. (Fig. 8A). The employment share of the US service sector has grown
continuously for over 200 years (other than a dip during the Civil War). What
stands out in recent US history is not the growth of services, but the decline in
industrial employment from 1970 onward. This is what many environmental
economists think of as the ‘service transition’ — the replacement of industrial
activity with service activity. The problem is that this deindustrialization trend
is likely an artifact of global trade. The US is now a massive net importer of goods
(Gierlinger and Krausmann, 2012). This means that industrial employment is
far smaller than it would be if all goods production happened domestically.
The only way to be sure that trade effects are not involved is to look at the
world economy — the only closed economy on Earth. On the world scale, there
is no hint of deindustrialization (Fig. 8B). Instead, the trends mirror the long-
term behavior in the US. Agriculture employment is declining, service sector
employment is increasing, and industrial employment is roughly constant. This
suggests that a service transition is a long-term process in which service employ-
ment replaces agricultural employment.
Thus, to evaluate the ‘dematerialization through services’ hypothesis, we
must give the most weight to long-term trends. On this front, the evidence is
clear. Over the long term, a service transition does not lead to relative carbon
dematerialization. And even if we are interested in short-term trends, we still
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Figure 8: Labor Structure Changes in the United States and the World
This figure shows historical changes in the three-sector labor structure of the United
States economy (Panel A) and the world economy (Panel B). For US data sources and
methods, see the Appendix. World data comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2). World
sector composition is calculated using national averages, weighted by national labor
force size.
have a problem. Relative carbon dematerialization has nothing to do with sus-
tainability. Instead, it indicates how societies value economic activity in relation
to carbon emissions. This valuation is an interesting sociological process that is
worth studying. But it does not measure biophysical sustainability.
5.3 The Failure of Absolute Carbon Dematerialization
The failure of absolute carbon dematerialization through services is due to two
factors. First, the fossil fuel energy fraction increases with service sector size
(Figs. 6A and 6B). Second, energy use per capita tends to increase with a service
transition (Fig. 9). Given these two trends, it is unsurprising that absolute
dematerialization through services fails.
What is surprising is the pervasiveness of the energy-services relation. A link
between energy use and service employment is evident at many levels of analy-
sis. It is evident for the world as a whole (Fig. 9A). This is important, because
the world is a closed system, so we can be sure that trade effects are not at play
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(i.e. offshoring pollution-intensive industry). A trend between energy use and
service sector employment is evident between countries (Fig. 9B) and within
countries (Fig. 9C). It is also evident over two centuries of US history (Fig. 9D).
An energy-service trend is also evident within US industry. Figure 9E plots
energy use per worker in US industry against the employment share of non-
production workers in industry. Non-production workers are employed by goods-
producing firms, but not directly involved with production (BLS, 1957). These
workers do service-type activity within industry. Evidently this service-type ac-
tivity tends to grow as industrial energy use increases.
To summarize, an energy-services relation is evident at the global, interna-
tional, national, and sectoral level. Moreover, this energy comes mostly from
fossil fuels. As a result, a service transition is associated with greater carbon
emissions.
5.4 Why is a Service Transition Associated With Greater Energy Use?
The increase of energy use with a service transition seems counter-intuitive.
Compared to industry, the service sector uses far less direct energy per worker
(Fig. 1). Yet the growth of service employment is strongly associated with the
growth of energy use per capita. How can this be?
Jesper Jespersen points out a flaw in the ‘dematerialization through services’
reasoning. It assumes that a society can replace industrial activity with service
activity, while leaving the structure of both sectors unchanged. But this is not
what happens. Jespersen elaborates:
A significant and perhaps fundamental weakness of [the ‘dematerialization
through services’ proposal] is that in the real economy (especially within the
private sector) agriculture, manufacturing and services cannot be treated sep-
arately. Goods cannot be produced, sold and consumed without involving ser-
vices related to business, finance, transport, the wholesale and retail trade,
communication, waste processing and so on. In many respects these activities
are complements rather than substitutes. The point is that it is not possible just
to switch between the manufacturing and service sectors because the indirect
impact of changes in the altered manufacturing sector on the service sector is
quite considerable. (Jespersen, 1999)
In reality, a service transition is associated with a host of complex social
changes. Most importantly, the growth of services is related to economic growth.
This is an old idea, not a new discovery. More than 70 years ago Colin Clark
argued that “the most important concomitant of economic progress” was “the
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Figure 9: Energy Use per Capita vs. Service Sector Employment
This figure plots energy use per capita against service sector employment share. Panel A shows
the world as a whole. World service employment share is the average of all national data,
weighted by national labor force size. Panel B shows the trend between countries. Each line rep-
resents a country’s path through time. Panel C shows the distribution of within-country trends
between energy use per capita and service employment share. Results are for the scaling expo-
nent α of log-log regressions (see Eqs. 1 and 2). Panel D plots two centuries of data from the
United States. Panel E plots labor-structure change inside US industry. The growth of energy
use per worker in US industry is strongly related to the growth of non-production workers in
industry (i.e. service-type workers). R2 values are for log-log regressions. Grey regions indicate
the 95% prediction interval of each regression. All panels (except Panel C) use log-log scales.
Data for Panels A, B and C come from the World Bank (Tbl. 2), with the exception of world
energy use, which comes from the BP Statistical Review 2017. US data sources are discussed in
the Appendix.
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movement of working population from agriculture to manufacture, and from
manufacture to commerce and services” (Clark, 1940). Proponents of ‘dema-
terialization through services’ have forgotten this idea. If a service transition
is a key part of economic growth, it is easy to see why it fails to reduce emis-
sions. Economic growth is overwhelmingly associated with increases in energy
use (Brown et al, 2011, 2014).
To understand the link between economic growth, energy, and sectoral change,
it is helpful to focus on labor productivity. Economists are nearly unanimous
that economic growth involves increasing worker productivity. But what is of-
ten undiscussed is that increasing productivity generally requires greater energy
use. Why? Productivity growth is typically achieved by augmenting human la-
bor with machines. And these machines require energy to function. The laws
of thermodynamics forbid otherwise. Thus mechanization requires ramping up
the energy used by machines. Not suprisingly, there is a strong relation between
labor productivity and energy use (Cleveland et al, 1984; Hall et al, 1986; Fix,
2015).
But how does the growth of productivity relate to a service transition? One
possibility is that the service sector grows to consume the surplus produced in
other sectors. Giampietro et al. credit George Zipf (1941) for first emphasizing
consumption capacity:
Zipf proposed a basic principle of socio-economic development: if an economy
wants to be able to produce more, it has to invest more in consuming. This
principle implies that socio-economic development must be based on achiev-
ing an internal balance between parallel investments both of human activity
and of energy over the two compartments of production and consumption ...
(Giampietro et al, 2012)
Another possibility is that the service sector provides facilitation activity to
other sectors (North, 1990). Many services (such as accounting, logistics, educa-
tion, etc.) are essential to goods production. It seems plausible that the demand
for these services grows with energy use. Indeed, the evidence in Figure 9D
hints that this is the case. As energy use per worker in US industry increases,
so does the share of service-type activity (measured as the employment share of
non-production workers).
Why is there a link between energy use and facilitation activity? A plausi-
ble reason is that increasing energy use requires more complex technology (Fix,
2017). As an example, consider the difference between subsistence and indus-
trial agriculture. Subsistence farmers produce most of their own tools. Industrial
farmers do not. Think of the large machines used by industrial farmers. Now pic-
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Figure 10: Service Sector Share of Value Added vs. Share of Employment
Panel A plots national data for service value-added share against service employment
share. Lines represent the path through time of countries. The R2 value is for a lin-
ear regression conducted on national averages. The shaded region indicates the 95%
prediction interval of the regression. Panel B shows the distribution of within-country
trends. The ‘within-country slope’ measures the average change in service share of value
added for a unit change in service share of employment. All data comes from the World
Bank (Tbl. 2).
ture the services needed to produce and maintain these machines. This includes
the engineers who design the machines, the administrators who coordinate pro-
duction, the educators who train the skilled workforce, and so on. It may be a
general rule that facilitation activity tends to grow as technology becomes more
complex. This is consistent with the tendency for social complexity to increase
with economic development (Carneiro, 1967; Naroll, 1956; Zipf, 1949).
I have focused on the movement of employment between sectors because
it makes the flaws in the ‘dematerialization through services’ hypothesis easi-
est to spot. But what if a country increases the service sector’s share of value
added without shifting employment? While this may be possible in principle,
the evidence suggests it is hard to do in practice. National variation in service
sector employment share accounts for about 37% of the variation in service sec-
tor value-added share (Fig. 10A). Within countries, a 1% increase in service
employment share leads to an average increase of 0.75% in service value-added
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share (Fig. 10B). This is not hard to understand. Most services are labor in-
tensive (think health care and education) and increasing labor productivity is
difficult (Baumol, 1967).
6 Conclusions
In 1972, the Club of Rome released its famous report The Limits to Growth
(Meadows, 1972). Since then, economists have debated whether economic
growth can decouple from environmental impact. Proponents of the ‘environ-
mental Kuznets curve’ argue that decoupling is possible (Grossman and Krueger,
1994; Panayotou, 1993; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992). The idea is that en-
vironmental impact first rises and then falls with economic growth. The transi-
tion to services provides a plausible mechanism for this decoupling. Panayotou
et al (2000) propose that “economic growth brings about structural change that
shifts the center of gravity of the economy from low-polluting agriculture to
high-polluting industry and eventually back to low polluting services”.
The problem with this hypothesis is that it neglects the complex social changes
that come with a service transition. As Colin Clark (1940) observed long ago,
sectoral change seems to be a key part of economic growth. And economic
growth is strongly associated with the growth of fossil fuel energy use (Brown
et al, 2011, 2014). When framed this way, it is not surprising that the ‘dema-
terialization through services’ hypothesis fails. I find no evidence that a service
transition reduces carbon emissions. Instead, it is associated with the growth of
per capita emissions.
What are the implications for policy makers? It seems that a service tran-
sition does not ‘automatically’ lead to decreased environmental impact. This
implies that purposeful policy intervention is required. It is obviously important
to decarbonize energy sources by investing in renewable energy. But it is un-
clear how this relates to sectoral change (if it relates at all). Future research
may make this clearer. But for now, we can draw a simple conclusion. The evi-
dence indicates that ‘dematerialization through services’ is not a valid policy for
reducing carbon emissions.
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A Sources and Methods
US energy intensity by sector (Fig. 1): Sources and methods for calculating
US sectoral energy use, employment, and value added are shown in Table 7. Ex-
cept for energy consumption in the US service sector, all data is taken as given
from the official data. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) uses energy con-
sumption categories that differ from the standard national income and product
accounts categories used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The EIA en-
ergy data uses four categories: Industrial use, Commercial use, Transport use,
and Residential use.
To allocate transport energy to the service sector, I apply the method de-
veloped by Giampietro, Mayumi, and Sorman (2012; 2013). I define service
sector energy use (EService) as commercial energy (ECommercial) plus work-related
transport energy (EWork-Related Transport).
EService = ECommercial + EWork-Related Transport (4)
work-related transport energy is calculated by subtracting non-work related
energy from transport energy. Non-work related transport energy is defined as
all transport energy minus light-duty vehicle energy consumed for non-work
related trips.
EWork-Related Transport = ETransport − ELight-Duty · VMTNon-WorkVMTTotal (5)
Here VMT stands for vehicle-miles-traveled. Data for US light-duty vehicle en-
ergy use comes from various EIA Annual Energy Outlooks from 2000 to 2018.
Vehicle-miles-traveled data comes from the National Household Travel Survey
2009 and 2017.
Table 7: Sources and Methods for US Sectoral Energy Use, Employment, and Value Added
Industry Services Source
Energy Use Industry Energy Commercial Energy + Work-Related Transport Energy EIA Annual Energy Review Table 2.1
Various Annual Energy Outlooks
National Household Travel Survey 2009 &2017
Employment Mining Wholesale Trade BEA Table 6.8D
Utilities Retail Trade Persons Engaged in Production
Construction Transportation and Warehousing
Manufacturing Information
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Management of Companies
Administrative and Waste Management Services
Education Services
Health Care and Social Assistance
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation
Accommodation and food services
Other Services
Government
Value Added Mining Wholesale Trade BEA Real Value Added by Industry
Utilities Retail Trade
Construction Transportation and Warehousing
Manufacturing Information
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental, Leasing
Professional and Business Services
Education Services, Health Care, Social Assistance
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services
Other Services
Government
Notes: EIA = Energy Information Agency, BEA = US Bureau of Economic Analysis
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US sectoral composition and historical energy use (Figs. 7B and D, 8A and
9D). US sectoral labor composition sources are shown in Table 8. Because the
series are not mutually consistent, there is inherent ambiguity in the historical
data. To quantify this ambiguity, I use a Monte Carlo technique to randomly
splice together the series in different ways. I then use the median of this spliced
data.
US historical energy and fossil fuel use data (1800–1945) comes from EIA
Annual Review 2009, Table E1. Fossil fuel energy use data begins in 1850. I use
an exponential regression to extrapolate trends back to 1800. US energy data
from 1949 onward comes from the EIA Annual Energy Review, Table 1.3.
Table 8: Sources for US Sectoral Labor Composition
Years Sector Source Description
1800 – 1920 All HSUS Table BA814-830 The labor force, by industry: 1800–1960
1920 – 1929 Agriculture HSUS Table BA470-477 Labor force, employment, and unemploy-
ment: 1890–1990
1920 – 1929 Non-Agriculture HSUS Table BA840-848 Employees on non-agricultural payrolls,
by industry: 1919–1999
1929 – 1948 All BEA Table 6.8A Persons Engaged in Production
1948 – 1987 All BEA Table 6.8B Persons Engaged in Production
1987 – 2000 All BEA Table 6.8C Persons Engaged in Production
1998 – 2016 All BEA Table 6.8D Persons Engaged in Production
HSUS = Historical Statistics of the United States; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis
US industry energy use and non-production employment (Fig. 9E): US in-
dustry energy data comes from EIA Annual Energy Review Table 2.1. Industry
employment comes from BEA Tables 6.8A-D (persons engaged in production).
I calculate employment of non-production workers in industry is using Bureau
of Labor Statistics series CES0600000006 (Production and non-supervisory em-
ployees, goods-producing) and series CES0600000001 (All employees, goods-
producing). I define non-production workers as the difference between total
employment and production employment.
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